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767 
FASB –THE IRS’S NEW BEST FRIEND: HOW FIN 48 
AFFECTS THE TAXPAYER-IRS RELATIONSHIP 
AND POTENTIAL TAXPAYER CHALLENGES 
“[I]t would not be overstating the case to conclude that FIN 48 
may prove to be one of the most significant enforcement tools the 
IRS has been presented with in recent years.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
For Big Ben’s Barbeque, business was booming.2 What was once 
just a sole street-side barbeque stand in the mountains of North 
Georgia had evolved into a lucrative and well-known producer of a 
barbeque sauce. The founder, Ben, negotiated a line of credit with a 
local bank to fund the day-to-day operations. To protect the bank’s 
investment, it required the company to submit financial statements, 
audited by an “independent” audit firm.3 As his production capacity 
grew, Ben began selling limited quantities of barbeque sauce in North 
Carolina. 
It was this interstate expansion that added the word “nexus” to 
Ben’s tax vocabulary. In short, once a taxpayer establishes a 
“substantial nexus”4 with another state, the taxpayer must file an 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Jennifer Blouin, Cristi Gleason, Lillian Mills & Stephanie Sikes, Do Firms Eat Their Tax 
Cookies Before FIN 48 Reveals the Cookie Jar? (Sept. 3, 2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Arizona) (on file with authors). 
 2. The facts of the following hypothetical are intended to illustrate the implications of FIN 48 and 
are not derived from any source. 
 3. “Independent auditors” are hired by a taxpayer to attest to the accuracy of the taxpayer’s 
financial statements. See H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 148 (N.J. 1983) (overruled on 
other grounds). An “independent audit” may be needed for many different reasons, such as to comply 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), or, as with Ben, to comply with the terms of a line 
of credit. “Examiners,” on the other hand, are “auditors” employed by tax agencies, like the IRS, to 
enforce tax laws and collect tax revenue. See generally Kevin M. McCarron, Tax Examiners, revenue 
agents and collectors, Occupational Outlook Quarterly, Spring, 2001, at 33, available at 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/ooq/2001/Spring/art05.pdf. 
 4. For a taxpayer, “nexus” exists within a state when the connection between the taxpayer and that 
state is sufficient for the state to constitutionally impose a tax on the taxpayer. See VentureLine, Nexus, 
http://www.ventureline.com/Glossary_n.asp. 
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income tax return in that state.5 However, the line that separates what 
is and is not a “substantial nexus” is far from clear.6 Three years ago, 
for the first time, Ben’s accountant determined that if the company’s 
decision to not file a return in North Carolina were challenged, the 
company could lose the argument. In discussing their options, Ben 
simply said, “Minimize taxes, but don’t break the law.” 
The accountant was routinely familiar with his ethical 
responsibilities. In accordance with his “right and responsibility to be 
an advocate for [his client],”7 he knew he could take a favorable 
position so long as, if challenged, the position has a “realistic 
possibility of being sustained.”8 He concluded that their position 
easily met the “reasonably possible” standard three years ago and still 
does today. Accordingly, his decision not to file a return in North 
Carolina fell entirely within his ethical duties. 
Although the independent auditors routinely inquired about 
potential liabilities resulting from litigation, including tax litigation, 
no financial statement disclosure regarding the tax position was 
required.9 Last week, however, just when Ben thought he knew all he 
would ever have to know about taxes, his accountant called, 
mumbling excitedly about something called “FIN 48.”10 As if he had 
just discovered color television, he explained how FIN 48 would 
change the company’s financial statements as a result of the 
                                                                                                                 
 5. See, e.g., Lanco, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 908 A.2d 176 (N.J. 2006) (holding that a 
sufficient economic presence is enough to establish a substantial nexus).  
 6. See, e.g., Jean T. Wells & Gwendolyn McFadden-Wade, Nexus and FIN 48: States of Flux, 204 
TAX PRACTICE CORNER 3 (Sept. 2007), available at http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/ 
Issues/2007/Sep/NexusAndFin48StatesOfFlux.htm. 
 7. Statement on Standards for Tax Serv. No. 1, Tax Return Positions, ¶ 4 (Am. Inst. of Certified 
Pub. Accountants 2000). 
 8. Id. ¶ 2.a. (realistic possibility standard); ¶ 9 (providing that a position may be taken even if it is 
not warranted). A “tax position,” in general terms, is a decision that a certain factual circumstance 
should be accorded a certain tax treatment, which is reflected in a tax return. See id. ¶ 1. 
 9. See Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 5, Accounting for Contingencies, ¶ 10 (Fin. 
Accounting Standards Bd. 1975), available at http://www.fasb.org/st/ [hereinafter FAS 5], (not requiring 
any disclosure when there is “no manifestation by a potential claimant of an awareness of a possible 
claim…”). 
 10. Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. Interpretation No. 48, Accounting for Uncertainty in Income 
Taxes (2006), available at http://www.fasb.org/st/ [hereinafter FIN 48]. FIN 48 superseded FAS 5 for 
income taxes. Id. app. C, ¶ 2. 
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company’s decisions not to file tax returns in North Carolina.11 
“Yes,” he said, “in this case, not filing a return is a ‘tax position’ 
under FIN 48.”12 Because some of these positions—taken in the 
current year and in prior years—do not have a fifty percent or higher 
likelihood of prevailing if challenged by a tax agency, the company 
will have to recognize13 additional liabilities not only for a portion of 
the unpaid tax, but also for interest and penalties, even though, most 
likely, no interest or penalties would ever be paid.14  
But the tax accountant didn’t stop there. Furiously pounding his 
ten-key, he calculated how much he thought the liability would 
increase over the subsequent year. This too would have to be 
disclosed in the current year’s financial statements, along with the 
“nature of the uncertainty” and the nature of the cause of the 
increased sales in North Carolina.15  
Ben was concerned not only about his accountant’s heart rate but 
also that such a financial statement disclosure could affect his debt-
covenant ratios,16 allowing the creditor to immediately call his line of 
credit.17 Most of all, however, he worried that the level of detail 
required in the footnote disclosures would practically invite litigation 
with the North Carolina tax agency.18 His sole debatable tax position 
is the “nexus” issue, and everybody knows the only other state with 
which his company could arguably be “connected” is North Carolina. 
Thus, as he saw it, this disclosure would effectively say, “North 
                                                                                                                 
 11. See id. ¶ 23. 
 12. See id. ¶ 4.a. 
 13. When an event is “recognized,” it is reflected in the financial statements, as opposed to mere 
footnote disclosure or no disclosure at all. See id. ¶ 10. 
 14. See FIN 48, supra note 10, ¶ 7 (requiring the presumption that any tax position will be 
challenged in applying the “more-likely-than-not” standard); id. ¶ 15–16 (requiring recognition of a 
liability for interest and penalties); id. ¶ 23 (applying FIN 48 to positions taken in prior years).  
 15. See id. ¶ 21.d. 
 16. For example, a creditor might require that if a debtor’s liabilities divided by its assets (the “Debt 
to Assets Ratio”) ever exceeds a certain number, the creditor shall have the right to call the loan, that is, 
to deem it immediately collectible. See Financial Education, Debt to Assets, http://financial-
education.com/2007/01/30/debt-to-assets/. 
 17. See, e.g., Internal Revenue Service, Frequently Asked Questions About FIN 48, 
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/article/0,,id=171859,00.html (“[FIN 48] may have an impact 
on loan covenants . . .”). 
 18. See discussion infra Part I.D. (discussing how FIN 48 could be a “roadmap” for a tax agency). 
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Carolina, if you examine me, this is the issue you should focus on, 
and this is how much I think you will probably win.” In other words, 
he thought this would reveal his tax strategies and legal theories—his 
“work product” —to his opponent in potential future litigation. 
Distraught, Ben and his accountant began to evaluate their options.  
Could Big Ben’s Barbeque object to making the disclosure itself? 
If not, he knew the company would have to prepare FIN 48 
workpapers to satisfy the independent auditors and that these 
workpapers would contain his legal theory supporting the position 
and an evaluation of the potential loss or gain to the tax agency.19  
Would North Carolina’s tax agency request his workpapers? If they 
are requested, could he refuse to provide them? If the agency simply 
requests the same workpapers from the independent auditor, could he 
prevent the independent auditor from disclosing them to the agency? 
Ben’s situation illustrates the concerns of taxpayers nationwide. 
Collectively, the requirements provide tax agencies with a roadmap—
a tool it can use for audit selection20—to identify positions about 
which a taxpayer is uncertain and to gain insight into the attorney’s 
evaluations of those potential claims.21 If the IRS gains access to FIN 
48 workpapers, legal theories, views on settlement viability, and 
detailed analyses of individual positions would be revealed.22 In 
subsequent litigation, with weaknesses and theories exposed, the 
taxpayer would be left “[s]tanding [n]aked [b]efore the IRS.”23 
This Note will address each of Ben’s questions, ultimately 
concluding that taxpayers are practically compelled to make the 
                                                                                                                 
 19. An auditor will generally obtain documents, prepared by the reporting company, that show in 
detail the individual components comprising a number reported in the financial statements or footnotes. 
The auditor will use those documents, called “workpapers,” to identify issues and request “evidentiary” 
support (i.e. invoices, contracts, letters from counsel). See generally CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 106, § 326A, ¶ .02–.03 (Am. Inst. 
of Certified Pub. Accountants 1980). 
 20. “Audit selection” is the process by which a tax agency identifies taxpayers to examine. 
 21. See, e.g., Roger A. Pies & Adam Gropper, FIN 48 Considerations: Tax Attorneys’ Prospective, 
TAX NOTES, ApR. 30, 2007 (emphasizing the value in issue-spotting). 
 22. See, e.g., Todd Reinstein, FIN 48: Will It Be a Roadmap for the IRS? FED. TAX WKLY.,  No. 8 
(Feb. 22, 2007) (emphasizing value to IRS of underlying workpapers). 
 23. Marie Leone, FIN 48: Standing Naked Before the IRS, CFO.COM, May 22, 2007, available at 
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/9216349. 
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required financial statement disclosures, but that the supporting 
workpapers should remain protected in the hands of the taxpayer and 
the taxpayer’s independent auditors. Unfortunately, however, until 
the courts or legislature uniformly protects the workpapers, taxpayers 
will face the substantial risk of having to reveal prejudicial 
information to taxing agencies. Part I will introduce the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board, discuss the purpose behind and specific 
requirements of FIN 48, and consider the methods by which the IRS 
may utilize FIN 48 to its advantage.24 Part II will analyze the current 
state of the law regarding the work product doctrine, focusing on the 
element of preparation “in anticipation of litigation” and “waiver.”25 
Part III will evaluate the FASB’s reasons for promulgating FIN 48 
and the likelihood that the rule will remain intact.26 Part IV will 
identify and assess the viability of potential challenges that a taxpayer 
may assert at various stages of FIN 48 compliance.27 
I.   THE BACKDROP 
A.   The Financial Accounting Standards Board 
Congress, through the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 
created the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and vested 
in it the power to set accounting standards.28 Since 1973, the SEC has 
delegated this authority to the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB), an independent body usually comprised of three individuals 
from public accounting firms, two from private industry, one 
academic and one investor.29 Thus, the powers of the FASB are 
                                                                                                                 
 24. See discussion infra Part I. 
 25. See discussion infra Part II. 
 26. See discussion infra Part III. 
 27. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 28. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (2006) (creating and vesting power in SEC). 
 29. See Accounting Series Release No. 150 (Dec. 20, 1973) (SEC concluding private sector would 
most effectively set accounting standards); Comm. Statement of Policy Reaffirming the Status of the 
FASB as a Designated Private-Sector Standard Setter, SEC Release Nos. 33-8221, 34-47743, 80 SEC 
Docket 139, at 16 (Apr. 25, 2003) (reaffirming FASB as delegate in light of Sarbanes-Oxley). See also 
David S. Ruder, Charles T. Canfield & Hudson T. Hollister, Creation of World Wide Accounting 
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limited to those delegated by the SEC—to set “financial accounting 
and reporting standards,” otherwise known as Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP).30 
B.  Taking Away the Cookie Jar: The Purpose of FIN 48 
The FASB issued FASB Interpretation No. 48, Accounting for 
Uncertainty in Income Taxes (FIN 48) to reduce the 
“noncomparability” of financial statements resulting from diverse 
accounting practices for income tax benefits.31 Before FIN 48, some 
entities adhered to a policy of recognizing tax benefits when ultimate 
realization was “probable;” others recognized the amount expected to 
settle; some used a probability threshold; and some did not 
consistently apply any methodology.32 Consequently, comparisons of 
financial statements between entities failed to provide adequately 
meaningful insight regarding tax benefits to a user.33 
Further, the absence of clear guidance enabled management to use 
the “cookie jar” method to inappropriately “smooth earnings.” If 
managers can reduce volatility in their income stream, “smoothing 
earnings,” they can reduce the perceived risk to investors, thereby 
increasing the stock price.34 For example, managers could reduce 
their “estimate” of potential future tax losses to give the company a 
needed boost in income (dipping into the cookie jar).35 Then, when 
income is plentiful, they can increase their same “estimate” to reduce 
income and replace the cookies.36 The catch? There may not always 
                                                                                                                 
Standards: Convergence and Independence, 25 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 513, 520-21, 523 (2005) 
(outlining history of the FASB and its predecessors). 
 30. Comm. Statement of Policy Reaffirming the Status of the FASB as a Designated Private-Sector 
Standard Setter, SEC Release Nos. 33-8221, 34-47743, 80 SEC Docket 139, at 16 (Apr. 25, 2003). 
 31. FIN 48, supra note 10, 
 32. Uncertainty in Income Taxes, A Roadmap to Applying Interpretation 48, DELOITTE, at 2, 
available at http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/us_assur_RoadmapFIN48a.pdf. 
 33. See FIN 48, supra note 10, app. B, ¶ 62. 
 34. See generally Michael D. Akers, Don E. Giacomino, & Jodi L. Bellovary, Earnings Management 
and its Implications, Educating the Accounting Profession, THE CPA JOURNAL, Aug. 2007. 
 35. Id. A reduction in this liability, known as a “reserve,” would have the effect of increasing net 
income for that period. 
 36. Id. 
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be cookies to put back in the jar.37 Prior to FIN 48, there was 
substantial flexibility in determining when and to what extent a tax 
benefit should be recognized, measured, derecognized, and 
reserved.38 Mandated consistency in accounting standards, such as 
FIN 48, curtails management’s ability to engage in this “cookie jar” 
approach.39 
C.   FIN 48: The Nuts and Bolts 
To fully grasp how FIN 48 may effectively provide a roadmap for 
the IRS, it is first necessary to understand what exactly FIN 48 
requires.  
1.   Scope and Effective Date 
FIN 48 is broader in scope than may appear on first impression. It 
applies to all income tax positions of all entities adhering to GAAP, 
including not-for-profit and pass-through entities.40 A “tax position” 
includes, for example, decisions not to file returns, allocations of 
income between jurisdictions, exclusions from taxable income, and 
determinations that an entity or transaction qualifies for tax-exempt 
status.41 For public companies, FIN 48 became effective for fiscal 
years beginning after December 15, 2006.42 However, because some 
entities were confused as to whether FIN 48 applied to them, the 
FASB postponed the effective date for nonpublic companies to fiscal 
years beginning after December 15, 2007.43 
                                                                                                                 
 37. Id. 
 38. See, e.g., FIN 48, supra note 10, at 2. 
 39. See generally Akers, Giacomino, & Bellovary, supra note 34. 
 40. FIN 48, supra note 10, ¶ 1. 
 41. Id. ¶ 4. 
 42. Id. ¶ 22. 
 43. Effective Date of FASB Interpretation No. 48 for Certain Nonpublic Enterprises, FASB Staff 
Position No. 48-2, ¶¶ 3, 5 (2008), available at http://www.fasb.org/st/. 
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2.   Recognition and Measurement 
Compliance with FIN 48 is a two-step process—recognition and 
measurement—subject to potential subsequent recognition, 
derecognition, and measurement.44 A tax benefit is recognized when 
it is “more likely than not, based on the technical merits, that the 
position will be sustained upon examination.”45 The “technical 
merits” of a position are derived from tax law and past administrative 
practices of the IRS.46 However, because this analysis presumes the 
position will in fact be examined, an entity may not consider the 
likelihood of being selected for audit.47  
Upon determination that a position requires recognition, the 
amount recognized is measured as the amount which is more likely 
than not to be realized upon “effective” settlement.48 To address the 
“cookie jar” problem, subsequent derecognition must be supported by 
new information, and reserves may not be used as a substitute for 
subsequent derecognition.49 
Positions that fail the “more likely than not” test will be reflected 
as a current liability,50 labeled “unrecognized tax benefits.”51 In 
addition, interest and penalties must be accrued on the unrecognized 
tax benefit as if the position had been rejected.52 
                                                                                                                 
 44. FIN 48, supra note 10, ¶¶ 5–8, 10–12. The first step, “recognition,” is the determination of 
whether the threshold for recognition has been met; the second step, “measurement,” measures the 
amount which should be recognized. Id. “Subsequent recognition” and “derecognition” refer to 
subsequent adjustments to or elimination of the liability. Id. 
 45. Id. ¶ 6. 
 46. Id. ¶ 7.b. 
 47. Id. ¶ 7.a. 
 48. Id. ¶ 8. This provision was amended to replace the phrase “ultimate” settlement with “effective” 
settlement. See Definition of Settlement in FASB Interpretation No. 48, FASB Staff Position No. 48-1, ¶ 
2-4 (2007), available at http://www.fasb.org/st/ [hereinafter FSP 48-1]. 
 49. See FIN 48, supra note 10, ¶ 11. 
 50. Current liabilities are “[a] company’s debts or obligations that are due within one year.” 
Investopedia, Current Liabilities, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/currentliabilities.asp.  
 51. FIN 48, supra note 10, ¶ 17. 
 52. Id. ¶ 15-16. 
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3.   Note Disclosure 
The disclosure requirements of FIN 48 are extensive. Entities must 
include a reconciliation of unrecognized tax benefits from the 
beginning to the end of the period, showing separately the increases 
and decreases resulting from tax positions taken in prior periods, 
positions taken in the current period, reductions relating to positions 
effectively settled, and reductions resulting from lapse of a statute of 
limitations.53 The total expense and liability for interest and penalties 
must be disclosed.54 Perhaps the most controversial requirement is 
the disclosure pertaining to unrecognized tax benefits that are 
“reasonably possible” to “significantly increase or decrease within 
twelve months of the reporting period.”55 For these positions, the 
entity must disclose the nature of the uncertainty and the potential 
underlying event and the “range of the reasonably possible change.”56  
D.   The Roadmap: How FIN 48 Helps Tax Agencies 
As if there were any doubt, IRS Chief Counsel Donald Korb ended 
all debate when he said, “IRS agents are not going to turn a blind eye 
[to FIN 48 disclosures];” rather, “[the IRS] will use the information 
to [its] advantage.”57 In fact, IRS examiners of large businesses are 
required to attend a six hour continuing professional education 
program on FIN 48 and how to use the disclosure information.58 FIN 
48 may provide the IRS with two sources of information: that which 
is contained in the financial statement disclosures themselves and, 
                                                                                                                 
 53. Id. ¶ 21.a. See id. app. A, ¶ 33 for an illustration of this “tabular reconciliation.”  
 54. Id. ¶ 21.c. 
 55. Id. ¶ 21.d. 
 56. Id. ¶ 21.d. If applicable, a statement that the range cannot be estimated will suffice. Id.  
 57. Richard Meyer, Real Beneficiary of FIN 48 May be the IRS, COMPLIANCE WK., May 30, 2007 
(quoting Donald Korb, IRS Chief Counsel) (internal quotations omitted). 
 58. Memorandum from Deborah M. Nolan, Commissioner of the Large and Mid-Size Business 
Division [hereinafter LMSB], FIN 48 and Tax Accrual Workpaper (TAW) Policy Update, LMSB-04-
0507-044 (May 10, 2007) (requiring the CPE program). See also LMSB Division At-a-Glance, 
http://www.irs.gov/irs/article/0,,id=96387,00.html. The LMSB defines large business as those with more 
than $10 million in assets. Id. 
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possibly, the supporting workpapers in the possession of the 
disclosing entity or independent auditor. 
1.   The Financial Statements and Footnote Disclosures 
The implications of FIN 48 are not limited to access to 
workpapers. The financial statements themselves may provide the 
IRS with valuable information.59 The Large and Mid-Size Business 
Division (LMSB) of the IRS explained the IRS will have a “better 
view of a taxpayer’s uncertain tax positions . . .[but not] a perfect 
view of the issues and amounts at risk.”60 
The adjusting entry to beginning retained earnings61 may serve as 
the first red flag.62 A typical implementation footnote might read, “As 
a result of the implementation of [FIN 48], the Company recognized 
approximately a $200 million increase in the liability for 
unrecognized tax benefits, which was accounted for as a reduction to 
the January 1, 2007, balance of retained earnings.”63 Although the 
entry will not reveal any specific issue, it will provide insight into the 
extent to which the taxpayer took aggressive positions in prior 
years.64 The IRS may be more interested in positions taken in prior 
years because it has a smaller window of opportunity to revisit those 
positions.65  
The footnote disclosures are far more informative than the 
financial statements themselves. The tabular reconciliation requires, 
among other things, disclosure of “decreases in unrecognized tax 
benefits relating to settlements with tax authorities.”66 An issue is 
                                                                                                                 
 59. See Pies & Gropper, supra note 21, at 6. 
 60. FIN 48 Implications – LMSB Field Examiners’ Guide, LMSB-04-0507-045 (May 2007) 
[hereinafter LMSB Field Examiners’ Guide] (heading titled “Answer 1”) (emphasis added). 
 61. Retained earnings are the “percentage of net earnings not paid out as dividends, but retained by 
the company . . . .” Investopedia, Retained Earnings, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/ 
retainedearnings.asp.  
 62. See Steven R. Schneider, FIN 48 for Tax Lawyers—Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes, 
48 TAX MGM’T MEMORANDUM 8, 4 (Apr. 16, 2007). 
 63. FIN 48, supra note 10, app. A, ¶ 33 (providing this illustrative disclosure). 
 64. See Schneider, supra note 62, at 4. 
 65. See id. at 5. 
 66. FIN 48, supra note 10, ¶ 21.a(3). 
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“effectively settled” when, for example, the IRS has completed its 
examination of the return but has not examined that particular issue, 
so long as it is “remote that the [IRS] would examine or reexamine 
[that] tax position.”67 Because the IRS adheres to a policy of not 
reopening completed examinations, this situation qualifies for 
recognition.68 However, the recognition of significant amounts of 
unrecognized tax benefits immediately after completion of the IRS’s 
examination might disclose to the IRS the value of the aggressive tax 
positions not previously examined; thus, the IRS would be tempted to 
reopen the examination and revisit those positions.69 The degree to 
which the IRS will exploit this disclosure remains unclear, but it 
appears likely that more examinations will be reopened as a result.70 
The IRS is also likely to closely monitor the “twelve-month 
warning” disclosures.71 For all positions for which the unrecognized 
tax benefits are “reasonably likely” to “significantly” change within 
twelve months of the reporting date, the taxpayer must disclose the 
nature of the uncertainty, the nature of the event potentially causing 
the change, and an “estimate of the range of the reasonably possible 
change.”72 Last, the interest and penalties disclosure will not typically 
provide insight into the specific positions, but it will provide the IRS 
with yet another measure of potential revenue.73 
                                                                                                                 
 67. FSP 48-1, supra note 48, ¶ 4 (May 2, 2007). 
 68. See generally LMSB Field Examiners’ Guide, supra note 60 (discussing the interplay between 
the IRS’S policy of not reopening returns and FIN 48). 
 69. See FSP 48-1, supra note 48, ¶ 12 (Trott, dissenting) (“[The] disclosure could give [the IRS] 
reason and incentive to reopen the examination that had been closed . . . .”); Schneider, supra note 63, at 
5 (“IRS’ interest is likely to be piqued if, after the close of an audit, [it] sees a large release of tax 
reserves.”). 
 70. Blouin, Gleason, Mills & Sikes, supra note 1, at 10 (Robert D. Adams, senior adviser to the 
commissioner of the LMSB division of the IRS, commented “that the IRS might reopen an audit more 
often than has been the past practice to ask about a FIN 48 disclosure”); LMSB, Frequently Asked 
Questions About FIN 48, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/article/0,,id= 163683,00.html 
(commenting that when the IRS “observes a large reserve released after an audit cycle,” applying the 
same criteria to reopening closed examinations, it “will take the necessary steps to protect the 
Government’s interest”). 
 71. See Schneider, supra note 62, at 5. 
 72. FIN 48, supra note 10, ¶ 21.d. 
 73. See Schneider, supra note 62, at 5. 
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2.   The Workpapers 
Absent any protection based on privilege, the IRS enjoys broad 
authority to demand workpapers, leaving taxpayers to rely primarily 
on the IRS’s self-restraint.74 
 a.   Workpapers: What Can the IRS Legally Demand? 
The IRS may examine anything which “may be relevant . . . .”75 
Unlike Rule 401 in the Federal Rules of Evidence,76 Congress 
intended “to allow the IRS to obtain items of even potential relevance 
. . . without reference to its admissibility.”77 Thus, because of the 
“congressional policy choice in favor of disclosure,” the IRS’s 
authority to demand workpapers is formidable.78 
 b.   Workpapers: IRS’s Policy of Restraint 
After the Supreme Court authorized the IRS to request tax accrual 
workpapers in United States v. Arthur Young & Co.,79 the IRS 
announced its intention to adhere to its “policy of restraint” and not 
request them.80 The IRS determined that FIN 48 workpapers are “tax 
accrual workpapers” and, therefore, are subject to the policy of 
restraint.81 However, two taxpayer concerns are left unresolved. First, 
in light of the FIN 48 temptations, how long will the IRS retain its 
policy of self-restraint? Second, under what circumstances might the 
IRS demand FIN 48 workpapers, despite its policy of restraint? 
                                                                                                                 
 74. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 816 (1984) (stating that, regarding the 
immunity of workpapers from disclosure, “Congress has endowed the IRS with expansive information-
gathering authority”). 
 75. 26 U.S.C. § 7602(a)(1) (2006). 
 76. Fed. R. Evid. 401 (broadly defining “relevance”). 
 77. Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 814 (1984) (emphasis in original). 
 78. Id. at 816 (emphasis in original). 
 79. 465 U.S. 805, 821 (1984). 
 80. See I.R.S. Announcement 84-46, 1984-18 I.R.B. 18 (noting the “administrative sensitivity” to the 
concerns of the accounting profession). 
 81. See LMSB, supra note 58 (announcing that IRS counsel determined that FIN 48 workpapers are 
subject to the policy of restraint). 
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There is reason to doubt that the IRS’s policy of restraint will 
remain intact because the entire policy is currently under revision.82 
Even though the IRS emphasized that it is revising the policy of 
restraint “overall and not just for FIN 48 workpapers,” FIN 48 
undeniably presents a tempting opportunity.83 Discussing the 
revision, Robert Adams, Senior Advisor to the LMSB Commissioner, 
elaborated, “The IRS is moving to more transparency.”84 “More 
transparency” can only mean more disclosure, which does not bode 
well for the longevity of the policy of restraint. Further, this would 
not be the first time the IRS has retreated from its policy of restraint. 
In 2002, the IRS narrowed the applicability of the policy to exclude 
“listed transactions” in order to “curb abusive tax avoidance.”85 
Second, even if the policy of restraint survives, the protection it 
provides is limited because IRS examiners are allowed to routinely 
inquire about the aggregate amounts in the financial statements or 
disclosed in the notes.86 In fact, the LMSB Field Examiners Guide to 
FIN 48 dictates that examiners should consider FIN 48 disclosures.87 
However, except for “unusual circumstances” and “listed 
transactions,” examiners may not request that the taxpayer produce 
audit or tax accrual workpapers, describe their contents, or reveal the 
existence of a reserve for any specific transaction.88 Taken together, 
although the IRS’s policy of restraint currently provides some 
workpaper protection, that protection is far from absolute, and 
further, the IRS may decide in the future to cease adherence to the 
                                                                                                                 
 82. Id. (“LMSB is evaluating [the policy] to ensure that it is still appropriate. . . .”). Yet, to date, the 
LMSB has not announced a change to the policy. 
 83. IRS Treatment of FIN 48 Workpapers May Change, FED. TAX WKLY, No. 7 (Feb. 15, 2007) 
(Robert Adams, Senior Adviser to the LMSB Commissioner, speaking to the Washington D.C. Bar 
Association Section of Taxation on February 8, 2007). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Announcement 2002-63, 2002-27 I.R.B. 72. 
 86. See Internal Revenue Manual § 4.10.20.2.2.b, available at http://www.irs.gov/irm [hereinafter 
I.R.M.]. 
 87. See LMSB Field Examiners’ Guide, supra note 60. 
 88. See I.R.M., supra note 85, at § 4.10.20.3.2 (defining policy for audit and tax workpapers); id. at § 
4.10.20.2.2 (identifying other requests essentially equivalent to a workpaper request). An “unusual 
circumstance” is generally when the examiner, after having exhausted all other potential sources of 
information, still needs additional facts. See generally id. at § 4.10.20.3.1.2. “Listed transactions” are 
those identified by the IRS as “tax avoidance transactions.” Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(2) (2007). 
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policy, at least as it pertains to FIN 48 workpapers. Thus, taxpayers’ 
primary objection is that the FIN 48 disclosure, or the workpapers 
that support it, will disclose their tax strategies and legal theories—in 
essence, their “work product.”89 
II.   THE WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE 
A.   The Work Product Doctrine: The Rule and its Purpose 
First established in the 1947 landmark case, Hickman v. Taylor,90 
and later codified in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,91 the work 
product doctrine exists to protect the adversarial nature of litigation.92 
To allow one litigant to benefit from the fruits of its opponent’s 
efforts would discourage diligent advocacy. 93 As Justice Jackson 
elaborated in Hickman v. Taylor, “Discovery was hardly intended to 
enable a learned profession to perform its functions either without 
wits or on wits borrowed from the adversary.”94 Thus, the doctrine’s 
founders foresaw a practice where attorneys and their clients would 
refrain from memorializing their thoughts in fear of having to 
disclose them to their opponents.95 To prevent illogically-developed 
conclusions based on faded memories, the work product doctrine 
creates and protects a “zone of privacy,” within which matters remain 
free from discovery and may be fully developed.96 
The doctrine currently protects from discovery “documents and 
tangible things . . . prepared in anticipation of litigation.”97 The 
opponent may overcome this protection only by showing a 
                                                                                                                 
 89. See discussion infra, Part II. 
 90. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 n.9 (1947) (adopting the work product doctrine from 
English courts).  
 91. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). 
 92. See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 516 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“[A] common law trial is and 
always should be an adversary proceeding.”). 
 93. Jumpsport, Inc. v. Jumpking, Inc., 213 F.R.D. 329, 334-35 (N.D. Cal. 2003). 
 94. 329 U.S. at 516 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 95. See Jumpsport, 213 F.R.D. at 334–35 (quoting United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66, 74 (9th Cir. 
1968). 
 96. See id. 
 97. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). 
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“substantial need” to prepare its case and the inability to obtain the 
“substantial equivalent” without “undue hardship.”98 However, even 
when such a showing is made, the “mental impressions, conclusions, 
[and] legal theories of an attorney . . . concerning the litigation” shall 
be protected.99 Within the context of FIN 48, two primary issues 
emerge: first, whether workpapers prepared to document FIN 48 
disclosures are prepared “in anticipation of litigation,” and second, 
whether the protection, if any, is waived upon disclosure in the 
financial statements or to independent auditors.100 
B.   “In Anticipation of Litigation” 
Courts have been trending towards broader interpretations of the 
phrase, “in anticipation of litigation,” to include materials prepared 
not only for the “primary purpose” of litigation, but also those 
prepared “because of litigation.”101 Tax accrual workpapers often 
estimate in percentage terms the likelihood of prevailing if 
challenged by the IRS.102 These workpapers may be created “because 
of” litigation, but for the “primary purpose” of satisfying their 
independent auditors.103 However, even among the courts interpreting 
the phrase more expansively, uncertainty remains as to whether a 
party may invoke work product protection when it is required by 
regulation to create materials containing legal evaluations and 
theories regarding future litigation.104 Materials created to comply 
with FIN 48 fall squarely within this category. 
                                                                                                                 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See discussion infra, Part II.B-C. 
 101. Tronitech, Inc. v. NCR Corp., 108 F.R.D. 655, 656 (S.D. Ind. 1985). See, e.g., Jumpsport, 213 
F.R.D. at 336-37 (following the “because of” test, as of 2003, the “more widely endorsed” standard, 
even though it was introduced in Adlman only five years prior). See United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 
1194 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 102. See United States. v. Textron, Inc., 507 F.Supp. 2d 138, 142 (D.R.I. 2007). 
 103. See id. at 150 (holding tax accrual workpapers protected in a “because of” jurisdiction and 
distinguishing a contrary case, United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1982), because that 
case was in a “primary purpose” jurisdiction).  
 104. Compare Melissa D. Shalit, Note, Audit Inquiry Letters and Discovery: Protection Based on 
Compulsion, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1263, 1279 (1994) (concluding work product will not likely apply), 
with Ricardo Colón, Caution: Disclosures of Attorney Work Product to Independent Auditors May 
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1.  Trend Toward the More Inclusive and Flexible “Because of” 
Test 
In 1981, in United States v. Davis, the Fifth Circuit adopted the 
“primary purpose” test.105 To invoke protection under this test, a 
party must show that the “primary motivating purpose behind the 
creation of the document was to aid in possible future litigation.”106  
However, in 1998, the Second Circuit in United States v. Adlman 
rejected Davis in favor of a broader “because of” test.107 Under the 
Adlman rule, a document is prepared in anticipation of litigation if “in 
light of the nature of the document and the factual situation in the 
particular case, the document can fairly be said to have been prepared 
or obtained because of the prospect of litigation.”108 The court 
emphasized that the purpose with which the document was prepared 
is “irrelevant to the question whether it should be protected” as work 
product.109 The court first looked to the federal rule, which protects 
materials “prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial.”110 If the 
rule was intended to limit protection to documents prepared “to assist 
in preparation for trial,” the words, “in anticipation of litigation” 
would be superfluous.111 Moreover, the policies of protecting “each 
side’s informal evaluation of its case” and encouraging independent 
preparation would be undermined if documents were unprotected 
“merely because they were prepared to assist in the making of a 
                                                                                                                 
Waive the Privilege, 52 LOY. L. REV. 115, 125-26 (2006) (concluding work product should and most 
often does apply under the “because of” test). 
 105. United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1040 (5th Cir. 1981); see Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1198 
(subsequently characterizing the Davis holding as “far beyond the issues raised”). 
 106. Davis, 636 F.2d at 1040. 
 107. Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1202–03. 
 108. Id. at 1202 (quoting CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, 8 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2024, at 343 (2d ed. 1994) (emphasis added in Adlman) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 109. Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1200. 
 110. Id. at 1197 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)) (emphasis added). 
 111. Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1198. 
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business decision expected to result in the litigation.”112 Adlman’s 
“because of” test is now overwhelmingly the majority rule.113 
2.   Materials that Would have been Created in Substantially 
Similar Form 
The Adlman court also stated that materials which would have 
been prepared in “substantially similar form but for the prospect of 
that litigation” are not protected.114 If read literally, materials could 
remain unprotected merely because they were prepared for a dual-
purpose, thus reintroducing the relevancy of the purpose for which 
the materials were prepared.115 This outcome would contradict 
Adlman’s holding that the purpose of creation is irrelevant.116 In 
Jumpsport v. Jumpking, Judge Brazil explained that Adlman did not 
intend for this language to create a bright-line exception to the rule 
that materials prepared “because of” litigation were protected.117 
Instead, the language was intended as a reassurance that the breadth 
of the new test was not unlimited.118 Such a reassurance was 
necessary because the Adlman test was introduced amongst 
                                                                                                                 
 112. Id. at 1199 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee’s note). 
 113. The “because of” test has been adopted by the appellate courts of eight circuits. See Maine v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 298 F.3d 60, 68 (1st Cir. 2002); Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1203; In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings (FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d 798, 803 (3d Cir. 1979); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Murray Sheet 
Metal Co., 967 F.2d 980, 986 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Roxworthy, 457 F.3d 590, 600 (6th Cir. 
2006); Binks Mfg. Co. v. Nat’l Presto Indus., Inc., 709 F.2d 1109, 1120 (7th Cir. 1983); Simon v. G.D. 
Searle & Co., 816 F.2d 397, 401 (8th Cir. 1987); In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Mark Torf), 357 F.3d 900, 
907 (9th Cir. 2004). But see United States. v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1040 (5th Cir. 1981) (adopting the 
“primary purpose test”). The Eleventh Circuit has not formally adopted the “because of” test, but agreed 
with the Second Circuit that the primary purpose test is “at odds with the text and policies of [the work 
product doctrine].” Regions Fin.Corp. v. United States, No. 2:06-CV-00895-RDP, 2008 WL 2139008, 
*4 n.7–*5 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Aldman). In the Tenth Circuit, a district court has adopted the test. 
See S.E.C. v. Nacchio, No. 05-cv-00480-MSK-CBS, 2007 WL 219966, *6 (D Colo. 2007) (10th Cir.). 
 114. Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1195. 
 115. See Jumpsport, Inc. v. Jumpking, Inc., 213 F.R.D. 329, 338, 342 (N.D.Ca. 2003). 
 116. Charles M. Yablon & Steven S. Sparling, United States v. Adlman: Protection for Corporate 
Work Product?, 64 BROOK L. REV. 627, 649 (1998) (The sentence “reintroduces concepts of business 
purpose that Adlman otherwise banishes”). 
 117. Jumpsport, 213 F.R.D. at 345–46. 
 118. Id. at 345–46 (explaining how parts of the opinion were unrelated to the facts before it, but 
attempted to dispel critics’ concerns, such as, for example, the dissent in Adlman). 
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formidable adverse precedent.119 Nevertheless, some courts have 
required the party invoking protection to prove that the materials 
would not have been prepared in substantially similar form in the 
absence of potential litigation.120 
C.   Waiver 
Fortunately, because the policies underlying the work product 
doctrine differ from those supporting the attorney-client privilege, 
work product protection is not as easily waived as the attorney-client 
privilege by disclosure to third-party.121 The purpose of the attorney-
client privilege is “to encourage . . . full and frank discussion” by 
maintaining confidentiality, while the work product privilege exists 
“to prevent a potential adversary from gaining an unfair advantage 
. . . .”122  Thus, it is more likely that FIN 48 workpapers will remain 
protected and not be deemed waived under the work-product doctrine 
than under attorney-client privilege.123 
With the underlying policy in mind, work product protection is 
waived by disclosure to a third party only if the disclosure 
“substantially increase[s] the opportunities for potential adversaries 
to obtain the information.”124 If the material is disclosed with the 
“actual intent” that an opponent may obtain it, the taxpayer may not 
subsequently invoke work product protection.125 Thus, within the 
context of FIN 48, the controversy will primarily surround whether 
an independent auditor is an “adversary” and whether the taxpayer 
                                                                                                                 
 119. Id. at 344. 
 120. See Maine v. U.S. Dep’t. of Interior, 298 F.3d 60, 70 (1st Cir. 2002) (denying protection based 
on insufficient showing that material would not have otherwise been created in substantially similar 
form); Grinnel Corp. v. ITT Corp., 222 F.R.D. 74, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 121. See United States v. Textron Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 152 (D.R.I. 2007). 
 122. Id. 
 123. See id. at 152–54 (finding that both the attorney-client and work-product privileges covered tax 
accrual workpapers and that the attorney-client privilege was waived but the work product privilege was 
not). 
 124. See WRIGHT, MILLER & MARCUS, supra note 108, § 2024. Work product protection may also be 
waived in other ways less relevant to FIN 48 compliance. See generally 23 AM. JUR. 2D Depositions and 
Discovery § 49 (2007) (discussing the various ways that work product protection can be waived). 
 125. See WRIGHT, MILLER & MARCUS, supra note 108, § 2024. 
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was de facto compelled to disclose the information either in the 
financial statements or to the auditor.126 
1.   Is an Independent Auditor an Adversary? 
Most courts properly hold that independent auditors are not 
“adversaries” in the context of a work product waiver.127 First, the 
“common interest test” should not be applied to disclosures made to 
independent auditors.128 Second, an application of the policies 
underlying the work product doctrine yields the conclusion that 
independent auditors are not adversaries.129 
 a.   The “Common Interest” Test and Independent Third-
Parties 
The “common interest” test is used in the classic scenario where 
two parties mount a common defense. 130 Because the two parties 
have common interests, disclosure by one to the other in no way 
makes the proceedings less adversarial; accordingly, work product 
protection is not waived.131 While that is undeniably a sensible rule, 
some courts subsequently applied the inverse of the rule and held that 
parties must be adversaries if they do not have a common interest.132 
But what about relationships of confidence or independence where 
parties are neither “allies in interest” nor “opponents?”133 The 
common interest test inappropriately excludes these relationships 
                                                                                                                 
 126. See discussion infra Part II.C.1-2. 
 127. Compare In re Pfizer, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 90 Civ. 1260 (SS), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18215, at 
*21-22 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 1993) (holding disclosure to an independent auditor does not waive work 
product protection) and Textron, 507 F. Supp. 2d at 152 (stating that “[m]ost courts” have found that 
independent auditors are not adversaries), with Medinol, Ltd. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 214 F.R.D. 
113, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that such a disclosure does waive work product protection). 
 128. See discussion infra Part II.C.1.a. 
 129. See discussion infra Part II.C.1.b. 
 130. See, e.g., WRIGHT, MILLER, & MARCUS, supra note 108, § 2016.2 n.35 (collecting cases). 
 131. Id. 
 132. See, e.g., Medinol, 214 F.R.D. at 115 (stating where the third-party is not “allied in interest . . . , 
the protection of the [work product] doctrine will be waived”). 
 133. See Colón, supra note 104, at 133-34 (arguing that auditors are independent, and that they are 
inappropriately deemed adversaries merely because they are not allies). 
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without considering the policies that underlie the work product 
doctrine.134 
If a disclosure does not make it substantially more likely that an 
opponent will gain access to the information, then protection should 
not be waived.135 At least one court has indicated that the disclosure 
of materials to an indifferent or independent third-party who is 
ethically and contractually bound to maintain the material in 
confidence does not change the adversarial nature of potential future 
litigation.136  
 b.   Application to Independent Auditors 
Independent auditors should be treated just as their name implies—
independent, not adversarial; therefore, disclosures to them should 
not waive work product protection. In holding that the auditor 
relationship is adversarial, Medinol relied on the Supreme Court’s 
comments in United States v. Arthur Young & Co., that the 
independent auditor is a “public watchdog” and “owes ultimate 
allegiance to the corporation’s creditors and stockholders.”137 The 
workpapers in Arthur Young were prepared by the auditors, so the 
work product doctrine never applied to begin with.138 The Arthur 
Young Court never reached the issue of waiver; it addressed an 
entirely different issue of whether there should be an accountant-
client privilege akin to the attorney-client privilege.139 In considering 
an accountant-client privilege, which would be based on “loyal 
representati[on],” it makes sense to differentiate between independent 
                                                                                                                 
 134. Id. 
 135. WRIGHT, MILLER & MARCUS, supra note 108, at § 2024. 
 136. See Genevit Creations v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 166 F.R.D. 281 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (extending 
work product protection to materials prepared in prior unrelated litigation because a confidentiality 
agreement was effectuated). 
 137. Id.; see also, e.g., Medinol v. Boston Scientific Corp., 214 F.R.D. 113, 116 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(relying on Arthur Young to find the auditor-client relationship adversarial) (quoting United States v. 
Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 818 (1984)). But see Colón, supra note 105, at 132 (arguing that 
this rationale is erroneous). 
 138. Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 815, 817.  
 139. See generally id.; see also Colón, supra note 104, at 133. 
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auditors and attorneys in terms of loyalty and advocacy.140 It does not 
follow, however, that the distinction between independent auditors 
and attorneys should be drawn in the different context of waiving 
work product protection, which is predicated on the likelihood of 
adversaries to obtain protected information.141 
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), 
in defining the relationship between independent auditors and their 
clients, expressly rejected an adversarial role in favor of one of 
“professional skepticism.”142 “[I]ndependence does not imply the 
attitude of a prosecutor but rather a judicial impartiality . . . .”143 
Moreover, not only are independent auditors “impartial,” but they are 
also ethically (and usually contractually) bound to maintain 
confidence.144 Ethically, auditors “shall not disclose any confidential 
client information without the specific consent of the client.”145 Thus, 
the risk that an independent auditor may reveal the protected 
information to a potential adversary is negligible. 
From a policy perspective, labeling independent auditors as 
“adversaries” for the purposes of work product waiver is 
undesirable.146 If a taxpayer knows that anything it gives to the 
auditor may end up in the hands of a tax agency, the taxpayer will be 
less inclined to comply with the auditor’s requests.147 The effect 
would be to undermine the purpose of requiring audits to begin with—
                                                                                                                 
 140. Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 817. Although the Court in Arthur Young declined to create an 
accountant-client privilege, Congress later created a “tax practitioner-client” privilege which, like the 
attorney-client privilege, is easily waived. See 26 U.S.C. § 7525(a)(1) (2007). 
 141. See Colón, supra note 104, at 133. 
 142. See id. at 133–34. 
 143. CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing 
Standards No. 1, § 220, ¶ .02 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1972) (emphasis added). But see 
In re Diasonics Sec. Litig., No. C-83-4584-RFP (FW), 1986 WL 53402, at *1 (N.D.Cal. June 15, 1986) 
(holding independent auditors are adversaries because they “ha[ve] responsibilities to creditors, 
shareholders, and the investing public”) (citing Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 817-18)). The Diasonics 
court, however, failed to explain how that fact makes it substantially more likely that opponents in 
litigation may obtain proprietary information. Id. 
 144. CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Confidential Client Information No. 301, ¶ .01 (Am Inst. of 
Certified Pub. Accountants 1992). 
 145. Id. 
 146. See Colón, supra note 104, at 132–35. 
 147. Id. at 134. 
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the protection of investors.148 Thus, independent auditors should not 
be deemed “adversaries” for the purpose of work product waiver.149 
2.   De Facto Compulsion 
To constitute a waiver, disclosure to a third-party must be 
voluntary.150 Disclosure compelled by a court order does not waive 
work product protection.151 Courts are also “reluctant to find a waiver 
of a privilege when [disclosure is made] . . . under circumstances 
indicating there was realistically no voluntary disclosure.”152 The 
degree to which practical circumstances demonstrate absence of 
voluntary disclosure, however, is rarely adjudicated.153 
 a.   FIN 48 Leaves Taxpayers With No Practical Choice 
Absent work product protection, GAAP-based taxpayers have little 
choice other than to disclose information containing counsel’s 
comments and assessments concerning possible litigation in their 
financial statements.154 The SEC requires that financial statements be 
audited in accordance with GAAS, and GAAS requires the financial 
                                                                                                                 
 148. Id. at 135. 
 149. The Arthur Young Court noted an additional concern that protecting similar workpapers would 
“destroy the appearance of auditor’s independence by creating the impression that the auditor is an 
advocate for the client.” United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 819 n.15 (1984). If this 
were ever true, it is not anymore. Under Sarbanes-Oxley, independent auditors are now held accountable 
to the Public Company Oversight Board (PCAOB) via  periodic inspections and, if necessary, 
investigations. See 15 U.S.C §§ 7211, 7215 (2007) (establishing the PCAOB and authorizing it to 
conduct investigations). Notably, all materials disclosed to the PCAOB are absolutely privileged. 15 
U.S.C § 7215(b)(5)(A) (2007). 
 150. See MARC I. STEINBERG & RALPH C. FERRARA, SECURITIES PRACTICE: FEDERAL AND STATE 
ENFORCEMENT, § 11:15 (2007); Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Stone & Webster Eng’g Corp., 125 
F.R.D. 578, 587–88 (N.D.N.Y. 1989) (affording protection when disclosure to adversary was not 
voluntary and noting that the waiver rule “applies equally to the work product privilege”). 
 151. See Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 573 F.2d 646, 648, 650 (9th Cir. Cal. 1978) 
(treating the attorney-client and work product privileges as the same, the court stated that “a party does 
not waive the attorney-client privilege for documents which he is compelled to produce”) (emphasis in 
original); see also STEINBERG & FERRARA, supra note 150. 
 152. See Simpson v. Braider, 104 F.R.D. 512, 523 (D.C. 1985) (collecting cases) (emphasis added). 
 153. See, e.g., id. (noting the “dearth of judicial precedent”). 
 154. See Colón, supra note 104, at 138. 
22
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 3
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol25/iss3/3
2009] FIN 48 AND THE TAXPAYER  
 
 
789
 
statements to be prepared in accordance with GAAP.155 Failure to 
meet these requirements would result in a “qualified opinion,” which 
would be financially devastating to most reporting companies.156 
 b.   Building on FAS 5, Accounting for Loss Contingencies 
The debate concerning work product protection is ongoing in the 
closely related context of attorney opinion letters written for 
compliance with the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 
No. 5, Accounting for Contingencies (FAS 5).157 FAS 5 requires 
recognition and disclosure of “probable” loss contingencies and 
disclosure of loss contingencies that are only “reasonably 
possible.”158 Because auditors lack the legal skills necessary to 
evaluate potential litigation, they are required to obtain “attorney 
opinion letters” from the client’s counsel.159 Thus, FAS 5 “put[s] 
corporations in a position of having to disclose information otherwise 
protected by the work product privilege to independent auditors.”160 
Commentators generally agree that taxpayers are de facto 
compelled to disclose attorney opinion letters to comply with FAS 
5.161 FIN 48 presents an even stronger case for expanding work 
product protection than FAS 5 because FIN 48 disclosures reveal 
information that is more useful to potential adversaries. For example, 
FAS 5 may not require disclosure when the potential claimant has 
                                                                                                                 
 155. CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing Standard 
No. 58, § 508.08(h) (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1989) [hereinafter AU 508]. 
 156. See, e.g., Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 819 n.14. A “qualified opinion,” as opposed to an 
“unqualified opinion,” effectively states that the financial statements are not prepared in accordance with 
GAAP in some material respect. See AU 508, supra note156, § 508.10. 
 157. See generally FAS 5, supra note 9; Peggy A. Heeg, Auditors Are Increasingly at Odds with 
Attorneys: Loss-Contingency Views, Which Are Subject to Privilege, Are at Issue, 29 NAT’L L.J. S1 NO. 
12 (2006) (describing the debate). 
 158. See FAS 5, supra note 9, ¶¶ 8–10. 
 159. CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing  
Standards No. 12, §§ 337.06, 337.09 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1980). 
 160. See Colón, supra note 104, at 139. 
 161. See Shalit, supra note 104, at 1281 (concluding attorney letters pursuant to FAS 5 are de facto 
compelled); Colón, supra note 104, at 136 (same). See generally Michael F. Sharp & Abraham M. 
Stanger, Audit-Inquiry Responses in the Arena of Discovery: Protected by the Work-Product Doctrine, 
56 BUS. LAW. 183 (Nov. 2000) (same). 
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made no “manifestation . . . of an awareness of a possible claim.”162 
FIN 48, on the other hand, requires the presumption that a claim will 
be asserted.163 Second, where a FAS 5 disclosure contemplates a 
virtually limitless number of potential or actual claimants, FIN 48 
disclosures pertain only to tax positions.164 Thus, while the law 
remains in a state of flux regarding FAS 5, FIN 48 may prove to be 
the catalyst that aligns the courts more uniformly with the 
commentators. 
III.   FIN 48: A LOOK TO THE PAST AND TO THE FUTURE 
Even though there are legal grounds on which to protect privileged 
information, they are uncertain, and taxpayers are likely to conclude 
that raising a legal challenge could be a bad business decision.165 The 
costs and adverse publicity associated with such a challenge, as well 
as the possibility that it would give the IRS yet another reason to 
initiate proceedings, may be too great to even attempt to invoke work 
product protection.166 Grumbling at the prospect of turning over their 
legal theories and evaluations to their enemy, taxpayers are left 
asking two questions: Should the FASB have promulgated FIN 48, 
and if not, what, if anything, can be done about it? 
A.  The Past: Should the FASB have Promulgated FIN 48? 
Without a doubt, the FASB, with FIN 48, has accomplished what it 
set out to do: improve transparency and comparability.167 And 
without a doubt, FIN 48 clearly regulates financial reporting and, 
                                                                                                                 
 162. See FAS 5, supra note 9, ¶ 10. 
 163. See FIN 48, supra note 10, ¶ 7.a. 
 164. See id. (limiting its application to income taxes). 
 165. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 818-19 (1984) (“Responsible corporate 
management would not risk a qualified evaluation of a corporate taxpayer’s financial posture . . . .”). 
 166. See discussion infra Part IV.A.-B. (discussing possible reactions of the IRS and investors to a 
taxpayer’s invocation of work product protection). 
 167. See, e.g., Meyer, supra note 57 (opining that FIN 48 eliminates confusion by providing a clear 
standard). 
24
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 3
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol25/iss3/3
2009] FIN 48 AND THE TAXPAYER  
 
 
791
 
consequently, falls within the FASB’s rule-making authority.168 
However, FIN 48 not only regulates financial reporting, but also 
substantially affects the legal relationship between the taxing 
agencies and taxpayers.169  Furthermore, the FASB rejected the 
“roadmap” objection for a reason which may be inappropriate.170 
This is disheartening if and to the extent that FIN 48 disclosures in 
the financial statements themselves practically compel the revelation 
of work product, but the FASB cannot be responsible for the 
inconsistency with which courts protect the disclosure of FIN 48 
workpapers to independent auditors. 
FIN 48 reflects the belief that the taxpayers deserve less protection 
against the IRS than against other opponents in litigation.171 In 
rejecting the “roadmap” objection, the FASB refused to “analogize[] 
the relationship between a taxpayer and a taxing authority to the 
parties in a lawsuit.”172 It continued, “A counterparty in a lawsuit is 
acting in its own particular interest, while a taxing authority is acting 
in the broader public interest in regulating compliance . . . .”173  FIN 
48, when compared to FAS 5, illustrates the different attitude. For 
example, FIN 48 establishes a presumption that all uncertain tax 
positions will be challenged, while FAS 5 excuses unasserted 
claims.174 
However, taxpayers should be entitled to the same level of 
protection against the IRS as against any other litigant. Donald Korb, 
IRS Chief Counsel, explained that “in an ideal world the views of the 
                                                                                                                 
 168. See Comm. Statement of Policy Reaffirming the Status of the FASB as a Designated Private-
Sector Standard Setter, S.E.C. Release Nos. 33-8221, 34-47743, 80 SEC Docket 139, at 16 (Apr. 25, 
2003). 
 169. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text (FASB’s authority is limited to regulating 
financial reporting); see also discussion supra Part II.C.2.a. (concluding that taxpayers are left with no 
practical choice). 
 170. See FIN 48, supra note 10, app. B ¶ 64. 
 171. See FIN 48, supra note 10, app. B ¶ 64; see also Tammy Whitehouse, First FIN 48 Disclosures 
Show Tax Struggles, COMPLIANCE WK., Apr. 24, 2007 (noting the “stigma on assertions of  attorney-
client privilege over tax documents” (paraphrasing Eli Dicker, Chief Tax Counsel for the Tax 
Executives Institute)). 
 172. See FIN 48, supra note 10, app. B ¶ 64. 
 173. Id. 
 174. See supra text accompanying notes 162–163 (comparing FIN 48 to FAS 5). 
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IRS and the taxpayer would converge on the right number . . . .”175 
Implicit in this convergence is the idea that both parties—the taxpayer 
and the IRS—will litigate with zealous advocacy, and through that 
zealous advocacy, the “right” result will eventually emerge in our tax 
laws.176 Placing taxpayers and tax agencies—opposing litigants—on a 
tilted playing field hinders the evolutionary process, and the quality 
of our adversarial system and the law it produces diminishes.177 Both 
the IRS and the judiciary embrace the idea that both the IRS and the 
taxpayers will push the envelope in protection of their rights, and that 
tendency will enhance a fair development of our tax laws. However, 
FIN 48 takes a contrary approach in suggesting that it is inappropriate 
for taxpayers to push the envelope. 
To the extent that a FIN 48 financial statement disclosure itself 
requires revelation of privileged information, FIN 48 disregards the 
work product doctrine in favor of transparency; that is, FIN 48 places 
reporting companies in the unenviable position of practically having 
to sacrifice protected information created in anticipation of litigation 
in order to comply with financial reporting rules.178 To be sure, only 
in rare circumstances will a FIN 48 disclosure itself reveal privileged 
information.179 This is of little solace, however, to those few affected 
taxpayers. 
On the other hand, the creation and disclosure of FIN 48 
workpapers to independent auditors, as opposed to the disclosure of 
protected information in the financial statements themselves, may 
enable taxing authorities to obtain the workpapers.180 Responsibility 
for this possibility, however, cannot rest with the FASB. In this 
arena, FIN 48 merely brings to the forefront a previously existing 
                                                                                                                 
 175. See Meyer, supra note 57. 
 176. Id. 
 177. See generally Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 516 (1947) (“[A] common law trial is and 
always should be an adversary proceeding.”) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 178. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.a. (concluding that taxpayers are left with no practical choice); 
see also Leone, supra note 24 (concluding that “the FASB has gone too far with FIN 48”). 
 179. See discussion infra Part IV.A.  
 180. See discussion supra Part II.C. (concluding that disclosure of FIN 48 workpapers to independent 
auditors should not be, but frequently are, deemed a waiver). 
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problem—waiver of protection through disclosure to an auditor.181 
Responsibility for that problem—a legal problem—rests with the 
legislature and the judiciary. In other words, FIN 48 does not 
mandate that taxpayers waive their privilege in an audit.182 In fact, 
strengthening work product protection would not in any way conflict 
with or infringe upon the purposes of FIN 48—transparency and 
comparability.183 FIN 48 workpapers could remain protected in the 
hands of an auditor, and confidential disclosure to the PCAOB would 
adequately ensure that FIN 48 disclosures are accurate and made in 
good faith.184 Thus, the FASB, in promulgating FIN 48, is not 
responsible for the failure of courts and legislatures to consistently 
protect those workpapers when disclosed to an auditor. 
B.   The Future: Is FIN 48 Here to Stay? 
As is evident from the vast uncertainty and diversity in the legal 
standards governing privileges and how they are waived, the work 
product privilege has proven incapable of providing a timely, uniform 
solution to the problem.185 Disgruntled taxpayers may direct their 
attention to Congress, seeking legislation that would uniformly 
protect the disclosure of FIN 48 workpapers to independent auditors.  
Congress could enact legislation prescribing that disclosure of 
protected materials to independent auditors as part of a financial 
statement audit shall not constitute a waiver.186 Congress has already 
provided this protection for workpapers disclosed by auditors to the 
PCAOB for purposes of routine examinations and investigations, and 
has also more recently created a tax practitioner-client privilege akin 
                                                                                                                 
 181. The waiver problem existed previously in the context of FAS 5. See discussion supra Part 
II.C.2.b.  
 182. See discussion supra Part I.C. (detailing the requirements of FIN 48). 
 183. See FIN 48, supra note 10, Reason for Issuing this Interpretation. 
 184. See supra note 149 (arguing that the PCAOB would adequately protect the investors, even if a 
taxpayer’s disclosures to independent auditors were confidential, with the exception of PCAOB 
inspections and investigations).  
 185. See discussion supra Part II.  
 186. See Colón, supra note 104, at 142–43 (“Congress must step in and enact legislation to clarify the 
inconsistency among the lower federal courts.”); 26 U.S.C.A. 7525 (creating a tax practitioner-client 
privilege). 
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to the attorney-client privilege.187 This legislation has already been 
called for in response to FAS 5.188 Because FIN 48 requires more 
intrusive disclosures that are more meaningful to opposing litigants 
or potential litigants, FIN 48 could provide the catalyst to trigger 
congressional action.  
IV.   TAXPAYER CHALLENGES “AS APPLIED” 
In absence of legislative action or judicial uniformity, taxpayers 
must rely on challenging FIN 48 “as applied” to them specifically. 
Taxpayers’ challenges to compliance with FIN 48, with the IRS’s 
requests for workpapers, or both, will primarily be grounded on the 
work product doctrine. Challenges on these grounds will most likely 
be raised at any of three stages.189 First, taxpayers theoretically could 
decline to make certain financial statement disclosures required by 
FIN 48, claiming that the information contained in the disclosure 
itself is privileged, a highly unlikely scenario.190 Second, taxpayers 
could refuse to provide workpapers to the independent auditors.191 
Third, taxpayers may instruct their independent auditors not to 
provide the requesting tax agency with FIN 48 workpapers.192 The 
following subsections will consider and compare the applicability of 
the work product doctrine and other considerations involved in 
raising a challenge at each opportunity. 
A.   Limited Disclosure 
A taxpayer could invoke protection of the work product privilege 
at the earliest opportunity by declining to disclose the relevant 
information required by FIN 48. This challenge would take the form 
of a “non-disclosure disclosure,” otherwise known as a “limited 
                                                                                                                 
 187. See supra note 149. 
 188. See Colón, supra note 104, at 142–43. 
 189. See discussion infra Part IV.A-C. 
 190. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 191. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 192. See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
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disclosure”—a note to the financial statements explaining that the 
taxpayer declined to disclose the relevant information because it is 
privileged. Because the omission of a disclosure required by GAAP 
would require the independent auditor to issue a qualified or adverse 
opinion, the taxpayer would attempt to enjoin the auditor from 
issuing a qualified or adverse opinion on the grounds of an 
incomplete FIN 48 disclosure.193 
Invocation of work product protection at this early stage of FIN 48 
compliance would be difficult, but not impossible. Only in rare 
circumstances would the financial statement disclosures themselves 
reveal work product.194  
In some circumstances, a taxpayer may challenge the “twelve 
month warning” disclosure.195 For unrecognized tax benefits that are 
“reasonably possible” to “significantly increase or decrease within 
twelve months of the reporting period,” FIN 48 requires the entity to 
disclose the nature of the uncertainty, the potential underlying event, 
and the “range of the reasonably possible change.”196 If only one tax 
position is expected to settle in the next twelve months, mental 
impressions regarding that specific position must be revealed.197 
Even if more than one position is expected to settle, because this 
disclosure usually pertains to fewer tax positions, it is more likely 
that the IRS could discern the attorney’s evaluation of a specific 
position.198 “[I]f there are five small issues and one big issue, it may 
not be difficult to figure out the company’s view of settlement 
prospects for the big issue.”199 
The disclosure of “effectively settled” positions within the tabular 
reconciliation may also reveal mental impressions.200 “Effective 
                                                                                                                 
 193. See CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing 
Standards No. 32, § 431.03 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1980) (requiring a qualified or 
adverse opinion if management omits information in a footnote disclosure that is required by GAAP). 
 194. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 195. See discussion supra Part I.D.1. (discussing the twelve-month warning disclosure). 
 196. FIN 48, supra note 10, ¶ 21.d. 
 197. Id. 
 198. See Pies & Gropper, supra note 21, at 6. 
 199. Id. 
 200. See discussion supra Part I.D.1 (discussing the reconciliation). 
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settlements” include not only express settlements, but also positions 
not examined during a completed audit.201 Through a process of 
elimination, the IRS could deduct the value of settlements of which it 
is aware and eliminate all positions it did examine to derive the 
attorney’s evaluation of unexamined positions.202 After narrowing 
down the possibilities to such a small pool, a tax agency may be able 
to discern a taxpayer’s evaluation of a specific issue.203 
These are the scenarios most likely to reveal protected information, 
but they are by no means exclusive. Essentially, any set of 
circumstances in which a FIN 48 disclosure allows the IRS to discern 
the value of a specific tax position, either directly or indirectly, 
should fall within the umbrella of the work product doctrine. 
If successful, this preemptive challenge would preclude the IRS 
from utilizing proprietary information in subsequent litigation against 
the taxpayer.204 Second, by avoiding the relevant disclosure 
requirements entirely, the IRS could not use the information for audit 
selection.205 
However, preemptively challenging FIN 48 compliance would in 
itself raise a flag.206 Both the taxing agencies and investors may view 
such an offensive maneuver as an indication of overly-aggressive tax 
positions.207 Further, because a limited disclosure would necessitate 
an injunctive action against the independent auditors—a suit in which 
the PCAOB would presumably intervene—substantial legal fees 
                                                                                                                 
 201. See FSP 48-1, supra note 48, ¶ 4 (completed examination may constitute an effective 
settlement). 
 202. See Pies & Gropper, supra note 21, at 6. 
 203. Id. 
 204. See generally Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) (defining the implications of work 
product protection). 
 205. See discussion supra Part I.D. (describing the “roadmap” that a FIN 48 disclosure could 
provide). 
 206. See Aaron J. Rigby, The Attorney-Auditor Relationship: Responding to Audit Inquiries, the 
Disclosure of Loss Contingencies and the Work-Product Privilege, 35 No. 3 SEC. REG. L. J. 1 (2007) 
(describing the same dilemma, but within the context of audit inquiry letters; corporations must either 
disclose privileged information or limit disclosures and “risk receiving regulatory/shareholder criticism 
or worse, a devastating ‘qualified’ [opinion]”). 
 207. Id. 
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would be inevitable.208 Thus, except in extraordinary cases, the 
adverse practical consequences are so severe that a limited disclosure 
would not likely be considered. 
B.   Refusal to Provide Workpapers to Independent Auditors 
Alternatively, a taxpayer could object to an independent auditor’s 
request to provide audit inquiry letters or other materials in the course 
of a routine audit—another highly unlikely scenario.209 If the contents 
of FIN 48 workpapers constitute work product, the workpapers would 
be protected, unless that protection is waived.210 Because the 
workpapers are never disclosed to the auditors, the uncertain issue of 
whether disclosure to an auditor constitutes a waiver is avoided.211 
However, similar to the assertion that the disclosure itself is 
protected, to avoid a qualified opinion, the auditor must be enjoined 
from issuing a qualified opinion on the grounds of a FIN 48 scope 
limitation.212 In comparison to a limited disclosure, however, this 
challenge draws less adverse attention. This procedure is defensive in 
nature, rather than offensive (like a limited disclosure), because it 
only arises after the IRS has requested proprietary documentation and 
after a FIN 48 disclosure has been made.213 For the same reason, 
investors and taxing agencies will not likely suspect that the taxpayer 
has taken an unethical or unreasonably aggressive position.214 
                                                                                                                 
 208. Because the PCAOB is charged with regulating the audit firms and one decision could set 
precedent for subsequent cases, the PCAOB would likely intervene. See generally 15 U.S.C §§ 7211, 
7215.  
 209. See Shalit, supra note 104, at 1310 (acknowledging the possibility of refusing an independent 
auditor’s request for an audit inquiry letter, but dismissing it as “unrealistic”). 
 210. See discussion supra Part II.B.  
 211. See discussion supra Part II.C. (discussing waiver). 
 212. See discussion supra Part IV.A. (discussing injunctions that should be obtained). 
 213. See discussion supra Part IV.A. (discussing how investors may react adversely to a limited 
disclosure). 
 214. Id. 
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C.   Refusal to Disclose Workpapers to the Taxing Agency 
Taxpayers will generally make the financial disclosure and provide 
the supporting workpapers to the independent auditors, waiting until 
a taxing agency demands the workpapers to raise an objection. 
Although the law remains uncertain, courts should afford work 
product protection to these workpapers.215  
Awaiting a demand by the IRS presents several advantages; the 
taxpayer avoids the adverse publicity which will likely accompany an 
offensive challenge.216 Additionally, the taxpayer may not be audited, 
but if an audit occurs, the IRS may not examine the position that is of 
particular concern to the taxpayer.217 Alternatively, the taxpayer may 
be able to satisfy the IRS as to that position without providing the 
proprietary workpapers.218 Thus, the taxpayer may minimize legal 
fees and await the last opportunity to object, a predicament which 
may never even arise.219 Thus, this option still protects the most 
damaging information—legal theories and evaluations on an 
individual level—without raising a red flag to investors or the IRS, 
whether legitimate or not, that the taxpayer may have taken 
unreasonably aggressive positions.220 However, by disclosing the 
workpapers to an independent auditor, the taxpayer subjects itself to 
the legal uncertainty of whether such disclosure constitutes a 
waiver.221 
                                                                                                                 
 215. See discussion supra Part II.C. (concluding that FIN 48 workpapers should not be deemed 
waived upon disclosure to independent auditors in the course of a routine audit). 
 216. See discussion supra Part IV.A. (discussing potentially adverse investor reaction). 
 217. See generally FSP 48-1, supra note 48 (discussing the effect of audits where an individual 
aggressive tax position is not examined). 
 218. See Heeg, supra note 157 at 12 (emphasizing the need for counsel to “negotiat[e] disclosure 
issues [with auditors] at the outset of the relationship” to reduce the risk associated with waiving 
protection). 
 219. See generally id. 
 220. See discussion supra Part IV.A. (discussing potentially adverse investor reaction and the 
possibility of triggering additional scrutiny from the IRS). 
 221. See discussion supra Part II.C.1.b. (concluding that disclosures to independent auditors should 
not be held a waiver, but acknowledging the inconsistent holdings). 
32
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 3
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol25/iss3/3
2009] FIN 48 AND THE TAXPAYER  
 
 
799
 
CONCLUSION 
Why is FIN 48 so problematic? After all, it only requires a 
taxpayer to disclose on its financial statements positions it thought it 
could not win, and everyone must pay their fair share, right?222 This 
seems to be the rationale the FASB adopted in promulgating FIN 48, 
and at least for clear-cut tax issues, it is undoubtedly appropriate.223 
Tax avoidance—a crime—is not a part of this debate.224 However, 
taxes are not always clear-cut. George W. Bush commented, “The tax 
code is a complicated mess. You realize, it’s a million pages long.”225 
Even Albert Einstein agreed.226 True to its name, “Accounting for 
Uncertainty in Income Taxes,” it is only at the margins—those areas 
of ambiguity—where FIN 48 enters the picture.227 
Ambiguity in the tax law is resolved by litigation—a system of 
adversaries.228 For effective common law to develop, courts must 
hear “zealous advocacy” from both sides in every case.229 Tax law is 
no exception. The FASB, however, refuses to analogize the IRS-
taxpayer relationship to a relationship of litigating opponents, and, 
consequently, affords less protection for the former relationship.230 
FIN 48 requires detailed financial statement disclosures, which 
compile a “roadmap” to lead the IRS to the positions taxpayers feel 
least confident about.231 These disclosures shift the power pendulum 
in favor of the tax agencies, and they have taken notice.232 The IRS 
fully intends to use FIN 48 to its advantage, both in the audit 
                                                                                                                 
 222. See FIN 48, supra note 10, ¶ 5. 
 223. See discussion supra Part III.B.1. 
 224. See I.R.C. § 7201 (2007) (defining tax avoidance as a crime). 
 225. How Long Is It? http://www.trygve.com/taxcode.html (Mar. 12, 2006). 
 226. Internal Revenue Service: Tax Quotes, http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/ 
0,,id=110483,00.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2009) (quoting Albert Einstein, “The hardest thing in the 
world to understand is the income tax”). 
 227. See generally FIN 48, supra note 10. 
 228. See generally Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 516 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“[A] 
common law trial is and always should be an adversary proceeding”). 
 229. Id. 
 230. See discussion supra Part III.B.1. 
 231. See discussion supra Part I.D. 
 232. See supra text accompanying note 57. 
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selection process and to spot issues within a particular audit;233 it may 
even begin routinely requesting FIN 48 workpapers.234 
The law is currently inconsistent, but the policies underlying the 
work product doctrine strongly suggest FIN 48 workpapers should be 
protected, even if they are disclosed to independent auditors.235 The 
disclosure itself may also fall within the work product doctrine, 
possibly necessitating a “limited disclosure.”236 Only in rare cases, 
however, would the disclosure itself identify individual tax positions, 
and even in those rare situations, taxpayers will likely decline to 
object in order to minimize legal fees and adverse public 
perception.237  
In the absence of much-needed legislation to add strength and 
uniformity to the work-product doctrine, taxpayers will unfortunately 
have to continue walking the line by attempting to satisfy the 
independent auditors while revealing to them as little as possible, and 
rolling the dice in hopes that their case will land in a more favorable 
jurisdiction. 
 
Andrew W. Jones 
                                                                                                                 
 233. See discussion supra Part I.D. 
 234. See discussion supra Part I.D.2.b. 
 235. See discussion supra Part II.B-C. 
 236. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 237. Id. 
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